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Abstract 
The activities of Microfinance institutions have increased in its attempt to helping the poor, and one of such 
activities is microcredit. However, in their attempt to help alleviate poverty, one major challenge that 
Microfinance face is loan default. This study seeks to examine the relationship between loan default and 
repayment schedule in microfinance institutions in Ghana with specific case study of Sinapi Aba Trust.  The 
study is an investigative type and only used primary data. Questionnaires were administered to some customers 
of the Tema and Lapaz branch of Sinapi Aba Trust and were analyzed by means of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
Regression, graphs and tables.  
The results indicated that, there was no significant relationship between loan default and repayment schedule in 
Microfinance institutions. Rather, the study finds significant relationship between interest charged on loans, 
moral hazard and over-borrowing by customers. Moreover, inability of loan officers to visit borrowers regularly, 
loans not being backed by collateral were also found to have contributed significantly to loan default among 
customers. 
Keywords: Relationship, Loan Default, Repayment, Microfinance 
 
1.0 Background of Study 
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), human development report (2009) the new 
century declared an action of solidarity and determination to get rid of poverty in the world. In the year 2000, the 
UN Millennium Declaration gathered various head of states of both rich and poor countries in order to put in 
measures to eradicate poverty. Besides, the various leaders promised to work together to meet concrete targets 
for advancing development and reducing poverty by the year 2015 or earlier. According to Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP 2001), nearly 3 billion poor people lack access to the basic financial services which are 
essential for them to increase productivity and manage growth of their businesses. As a result of these challenges, 
many poor people operate very small scale businesses. 
 
Microfinance has evolved as an economic development approach intended to benefit low-income men and 
women. Microfinance refers to the provision of financial services to low-income clients, including the self-
employed, (Ledgerwood, 2000). There are thousands of Microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the world that 
operate primarily in developing countries. Most of these Microfinance institutions are members of Global 
Microfinance Networks which aims at supporting partners in the developing countries. Despite the significance 
of MFIs, certain challenges do work to hamper the realization of poverty eradication. One of such challenge is 
the issue of loan default. Loan default has been termed the number one killer of MFIs, for the fact that, it is often 
a leading cause of MFIs Decapitalization and insolvency (Westley, 2005). Loans are considered as risk when any 
portion of the loan principal is past due. Besides, volatility of loan default in MFIs is higher than of commercial 
banks since most micro-loans are not secured by collateral in case of default (Rosenberg, 1996). Delinquent 
loans have serious financial and non-financial implications on the performance of the microfinance institutions 
in which the repayment schedule is a factor. 
 
In Ghana, Microfinance institutions include Non-Governmental Organizations(NGOs), Savings and Loans 
Companies, Rural Banks, Credit Unions, Rotating Savings Credit Associations(ROSCAs) and other non-
Banking financial Institutions. They all come under an umbrella of Ghana Microfinance Institutions Network 
(CGAP-2001). Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT) is an autonomous private and not for profit organisation established and 
duly registered in May 30th 1994 under the company’s code 1963 (Act 179) as a company limited by guarantee to 
support the economically active poor to enhance their lives through microfinance and basic business training. 
The vision of Sinapi Aba Trust is to become an institution dedicated to the building of a nation under the 
Almighty God where the strong help the weak and all people have the dignity of providing for themselves, their 
families, their church and their community”. The mission of Sinapi Aba Trust is to serve as a Mustard Seed 
through which opportunities for enterprise development and income generation are given to the economically 
disadvantaged to transform their lives. It is involved in the provision of loans to clients’ based on an assessment 
of clients’ business operations. There are limits to the amount of loan that a client can obtain at first and in 
subsequent loan cycles, but in most cases, the nature and size of clients’ business, rate of turnover (cash flows) 
and experience determine the amount of loan that one can obtain at any time. It also engages in the provision of 
some non-financial services in addition to the financial services.  
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1.2 Research Problem  
It is generally accepted that credit when put into productive use results in good returns. Credit provision is a 
risky business that may involve fraudulent and opportunistic behavior. Most microfinance institutions are 
therefore at a disadvantage of information on the borrower's behavior. (Mengistu, 1997). Although the 
performance of the MFIs has been impressive since their establishment, loan default is a major problem they 
face and is observed that, their declining repayment rate is a factor. Lending capacity of MFIs is destroyed due to 
default as a result of the declining flow of repayment (Hunte, 1996). Fischer & Ghatak, (2010) also argued that 
loan sizes increase as a result of more frequent repayment which eventually leads to over-borrowing. Does loan 
default have a relationship with the repayment schedule? In an attempt to answer this question, this study tries to 
analyze the factors behind loan repayment schedule, and the relationship it has with loan default by taking the 
case of Sinapi Aba Trust. 
 
1.3 Research Objective  
General Objectives: 
The main objective of the study is to examine the relationship between loan default and repayment schedule in 
microfinance institutions in Ghana. 
Specific Objectives: 
• To ascertain the causes of loan default in microfinance institutions. 
• To investigate whether clients use borrowed funds for its intended purpose. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The research sought to address the following research questions: 
• What really account for loan default in Microfinance institutions?  
• Does loan default have a relationship with the repayment schedule? 
1.5 Hypothesis 
• Null hypothesis: There is no relationship between loan default and repayment schedule. 
• Alternative hypothesis: There is a relationship between loan default and repayment schedule. 
  
1.6 Justification and Significance of the Study 
It is expected that the results of the study will help microfinance institutions especially Sinapi Aba Trust, to know 
the relationship that exist between loan default and repayment schedule. This will enable the company re-
strategize their repayment schedule in order to prevent loan default and also some causes of loan default.  
2.0 Literature Review  
2.1 Definition of micro finance 
Microfinance refers to the provision of financial services to low-income clients, including the self-employed. 
Financial services of MFIs include savings and credit. However, some offer payment and insurance services, 
(Ledgerwood, 2000).  
Theoretically, microfinance encompasses any financial service used by the needy, including those they access in 
the informal economy, such as loan from a village money lender (Susu). In practice however, the term is usually 
only used to refer to institutions and enterprises whose goals include both profitability and reducing the poverty 
of their clients. Microfinance services are needed everywhere, including the developed world.  
 
2.2 Evolution of the microfinance sub-sector in Ghana 
The concept of microfinance is not new in Ghana, in the past there has always been the concept of savings and 
micro loans. Available evidence suggests that the first credit union in Africa was established in Northern Ghana 
in 1955 by Canadian Catholic missionaries. However, Susu, which is one of the microfinance schemes in Ghana, 
is thought to have originated from Nigeria and spread to Ghana in the early twentieth century (Asiama & Osei, 
2007).  The microfinance sector has become successful due to the various financial sector policies and 
programmes undertaken by different governments since independence. 
In terms of the regulatory framework, rural and community banks are regulated under the Banking Act 2004 
(Act 673), while the Savings and Loans Companies are currently regulated under the Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (NBFI) Law 1993 (PNDCL 328) (Asiama & Osei 2007)  
 
2.3 Definition of loan default 
Peter Kenny in his article defines Loan default as when you fall behind with your monthly repayments. He states 
that, “if you are late with just one payment, then you are technically classed as delinquent”. Thus, default is the 
failure to pay back a loan. Default can be of two types which are debt service default and technical default. Debt 
service default occurs when the borrower has not made a scheduled payment of interest or principal whiles 
technical default occurs when an affirmative or a negative covenant is violated. However, the latter is not very 
common in microfinance institutions but mainly applies to banks. Loan default has been identified as probably 
the single largest reason for the downfall of institutions involved in the provision of credit. Thus the goal of 
achieving minimum loan default to ensure healthy loan portfolio will ultimately lead to the sustainability of 
MFIs.  
  
2.4 Causes and Controls of Loan Default 
Microfinance institutions must accept the fact that, most loan default cases are caused not only by bad borrowers. 
Aside the behavior on the part of borrowers which includes diversion of loans, over-borrowing, etc. which has 
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been noticed to have contributed to loan default, the MFIs are also noticed to have contributed to the loan default. 
They have not played their part well in implementing an effective methodology as to how to grant microcredits. 
In view of this, there have been various control methods.  
The MFIs should constantly create an image and philosophy that does not consider late payments acceptable. 
The benefit of creating disciplined borrowers is critical to the success of the microfinance institution, in their 
quest to eradicate poverty. The Loan products should be carefully designed suit clients’ needs, and also ensure 
that, the delivery process is convenient. 
 
2.5 Repayment Schedule 
Repayment schedule is the time that a borrower of a loan is supposed to pay for it. It thus outlines the schedule 
that guides the borrower in the repayment process.  In fact, the repayment schedule for micro finance institutions 
is different from that of banks. This is because in Ghana for instance, micro finance loans are not to be granted 
for period exceeding fourteen (14) months.  
 
2.6 Theories on lending 
The main business of most finance institutions is to grant loans and other microcredits to traders and other 
customers. However, in their attempt to lend, they are faced with the challenge of overcoming information 
asymmetries. Adverse selection and moral hazard has been the two main outcomes of information asymmetries. 
In the case of adverse selection, the lender lacks information on the riskiness of its borrowers.  Riskier borrowers 
should be charged higher interest rates to compensate for the increased risk of default than safer borrowers who 
are less likely to default. Accordingly, safer borrowers should be charged less provided each type can be 
accurately identified. Since the lender has incomplete information about the risk profile of its borrowers, higher 
average interest rates are passed on to all borrowers irrespective of their risk profile (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010). 
Moral hazard on the other hand refers to the inability of the lender to ascertain whether the loan granted to 
borrowers are used for its intended purpose, or that the borrower applies the expected amounts of complementary 
inputs, especially effort and entrepreneurial skill, that are the basis for the agreement in order to get the loan 
provided. The borrower may then be less able to repay if these inputs are less than expected. (Ghatak & 
Guinnane, 1999). 
 
3.0 Research Methodology 
3.1Research Design 
The research design is the investigative type. The analysis of information was done in both qualitative and 
quantitative ways. Cross-sectional data was employed to carry out this research.  
3.2 Population 
In research methods, population is the entire aggregation of items from which samples can be drawn. In this 
research, the population comprised of clients of Sinapi Aba Trust. 
 
3.3. Sampling and Sampling Technique 
One hundred (100) customers of Sinapi Aba Trust were provided with questionnaires to answer. Besides, a 
random sampling technique was used to derive relevant, reliable and sufficient data from the one hundred (100) 
clients of Sinapi Aba Trust. 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
In this study, only primary data concerning loan default and repayment schedule was used. Sources of primary 
data for this study comprised of customers of Sinapi Aba Trust. This was conducted through questionnaires. The 
questionnaire was developed based on the research questions and the literature on microfinance, loan default and 
repayment schedule.  The questionnaires used in this study included open-ended and closed- ended questions.
  
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
The data collected from the field were analyzed using regression analysis and charts represented in percentages. 
With our regression analysis, following Breza, (2006), we adopted the model below: 
=  + ( ) + 
   +  
Where: 
 = loan default for individual i 
RSi = Repayment Schedule for individual i 
  = Vector of control variables 
 
Includes: 
Li = Interest charged on loan 
Mi = Moral Hazard 
Oi = Over borrowing 
Ni = Number of dependents 
Gi = Gender 
  = error terms 
was measured by the number of times borrowers defaulted. 
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was measured by the length of time given to borrowers to repay the loan. It included dummy variables of 1-
4months, 5-9months and finally 10-14months. A negative sign is however expected at the end of the results.   
was measured by the amount of interest charged on the loan amount given to borrowers. A positive sign is 
expected at the end. 
was measured by looking at those customers who use loans for funerals, marriages, etc. other than the reason 
stated in the loan agreement. We expect a positive sign. 
 was measured by looking at those who took other loans in addition to that of SAT and a positive sign is 
expected at the end of the results. 
was measured by the number of people who are being taken care of by the customers who take the loans. We 
expect a positive sign at the end of the results. 
 
3.6 Limitations of the Study 
The research scope should have covered the entire Microfinance institutions in Ghana to give adequate grounds 
for generalization of the research findings but due to limited time frame the research was limited to Sinapi Aba. 
 
4.0 Data Analysis, Presentation and Interpretation 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Default 100 1.67 4.00 2.4383 .43722 
Interest paid on loan 100 12 2000 204.04 323.511 
Moral Hazard 100 1 4 2.71 .935 
Over Borrowing 100 1 4 2.11 1.034 
Gender of respondent 100 0 1 .48 .502 
Number of dependents 100 0 3 1.02 .816 
Repayment 100 3 14 7.04 3.008 
Valid N (list wise) 100     
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013 
Table 1 shows the statistical summary of both the dependents and independent variables of the study. Default 
measured by the number of times borrowers default has a mean of 2.4383 times. It is also clear from the table 
that the standard deviation was 0.43722 and the minimum and maximum values were 1.67 and 4.00 times 
respectively. The low range of default (2.4383 times) supports its low standard deviation of 0.43722 which 
means that there was a low variability of default. The interest charged on the loans had a mean of GH₡204.04 
which is measured by the interest on loans monthly. The standard deviation showed a figure of 323.511. The 
minimum and maximum interests were GH₡12 and GH₡2000 respectively. Moral hazard also had a mean of 
2.71 indicating that the majority of clients do not agree that they diverted the loans while minimum and 
maximum figures were 1 and 4 respectively. Standard deviation was 0.935 showing a low dispersion. 
The results above also indicate that over borrowing had a mean of 2.11 times as measured by the extent of 
additional loans that the borrowers take. It has a minimum of 1 and maximum of 4. Standard deviation measured 
was 1.034. Number of dependents also had a mean of 1.02 persons whereas the minimum and maximum had 0 
and 3 respectively. Standard deviation measured was 0.816. 
The mean repayment schedule was 7.04 months as measured by the length of time given to borrowers to repay 
their loans. The minimum and maximum values were 3 and 14 months respectively and with a standard 
deviation of 3.008. 
 
4.2 Regression Results  
Table 2: Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio Sig. 
Constant 1.344 0.211 6.368 0.000 
Interest 0.293 0.107 2.733 0.008 
Moral Hazard 0.103 0.045 2.279 0.025 
Over Borrowing 0.111 0.039 2.837 0.006 
Gender of respondents 0.061 0.076 0.797 0.428 
Number of dependents -0.005 0.018 -0.259 0.796 
Repayment Schedule(5-9months) -0.004 0.035 -0.127 0.899 
Repayment Schedule(10-14month) -0.037 0.141 -0.265 0.796 
Regression Diagnostics 
Observation               100 
R- Square                 0.305 
Adjusted R2                       0.252 
F-Statistic                 5.765  (0.000) 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013 
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4.2.1 Gender of Respondents: 
The gender included in this model was a dummy variable with male as the reference point. It shows that the 
females were defaulting more than the males. However, this variable does not have any significant effect on loan 
default. 
 
4.2.2 Number of Dependents: 
The regression result once again shows that the number of dependents has no significant effect on loan default 
with a t-statistic of -0.259. 
 
4.2.3 Repayment schedule: 
This is the main independent variable of interest in our study. It is a dummy variable with 1-4months as the 
reference point. The repayment schedule of 5-9months has a coefficient of -0.004 which suggests that the 
repayment schedule ranging from 5-9months were defaulting less than from 1-4months whilst that of 10-
14months were found defaulting less than 1-4moths also with coefficient of -0.037. However, both repayment 
categories have a t-statistic of -0.13 and -0.27 respectively which shows that the repayment schedule has no 
significant effect on loan default in microfinance institutions, though the expected negative sign was recorded. 
Therefore, researchers accept the null hypothesis which states that there is no relationship between loan default 
and repayment schedule and reject the alternative hypothesis of our studies. However, this is consistent with the 
work of Field & Pande, (2007) who concluded that the repayment schedule in microfinance institutions has no 
effect on loan default. 
 
4.2.4 Interest: 
The regression results shows that the interest charged on the loans has a positive effect on loan default in 
microfinance institutions. The coefficient of 0.293 suggests that when the microfinance institutions increases the 
interest charged on the loan by GH₡1, loan default increases by GH₡0.293. This variable is significant with a t-
statistic of 2.733 at 1 percent significant level. This implies that, default increases when interest rates charged on 
microcredit are also increased by the microfinance institutions. This is because their total amount to repay 
becomes higher and so are unable to pay at their maturity time and vice versa.  
  
4.2.5 Moral Hazard: 
The regression once again indicates that moral hazard has a positive relationship with loan default in 
microfinance institutions. It has a coefficient of 0.103 which suggest that an increase in moral hazard by 1 
percent leads to 0.103 percent increase in loan defaults. The variable is significant with a t-statistic of 2.28 at 5 
percent significant level. This implies that, when customers use the loans for different purposes especially 
unproductive purposes other than those stated in the loan agreement, they are unable to recoup the money and so 
unable to repay at their maturity time thereby increasing default and vice versa. This is also consistent with the 
work of Ghatak & Guinnane, (1999) who concluded that when moral hazard rises, borrowers are less able to 
repay loans. 
 
4.2.6  Over -Borrowing: 
Taken additional loans were also found to have a positive relationship with loan defaults in microfinance 
institutions. It has a coefficient of 0.111 which suggests that, 1 percent increase in over-borrowing leads to 0.111 
percent increase in loan default. It has a t-statistic of 2.84 at 1 percent significant level. This implies that, when 
customers take additional loans aside those granted by SAT at the same time, they are unable to repay all these 
microcredits at the same time and so default increases and vice versa. 
 
4.2.7 Robustness of Regression Model 
The goodness of fit of the regression model is determined by the value of the F-test. It is the way of determining 
whether our model is a better predictor of our outcome. It has a value of 5.755 at 0.01 significant level which 
shows that our model is a better predictor of the outcome. Also, the Adjusted R-square shows the explanatory 
power of our regression model. In the table above, it has a value of 0.252 which explains that, only 0.252 
variations in default is explained by the independent variables. 
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4.3 Demographic of Respondents 
Figure 1.0 Gender of Respondents 
 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
The diagram above in figure 1.0 shows the gender distribution of the respondents, with male customers 
representing 54 percent of the entire population of 100 and the 46 percent representing female customers.   
 
4.4 Marital Status of Respondents 
Figure 2.0: A graph showing the marital Status of Respondents 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
Respondents were asked about their marital status, and the above graph represents their responses. 28 percent of 
the respondents were single, 57 percent were married, 8% of respondents divorced and finally 7% representing 
widows/widowers. 
4.5 Number of Dependence of Respondents 
Figure 3.0 Number of dependence 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
28% 
57% 
8% 7% 
27% 2% 29% 
42% 
54% 46% 
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From the diagram above, 29 percent of the respondents had no people depending on them, between 1-3 
dependents was represented by 42 percentage of the respondents, 3-10 dependents represented by 27 percent and 
10 and above had 2 percent representing them. 
 
4.6 Extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents take other loans in addition to SAT 
Figure 4.0 Extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents take other loans in addition to 
that of SAT 
 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
The chart above shows that most of the respondents also took other credits from other microfinance institutions, 
the largest representing 38 and 23 percent representing strongly agree and moderately agree respectively. 29 
percent disagreed and the rest strongly disagreed representing 10 percent. 
 
4.7 The extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents repay their microcredit 
Figure 5.0: Extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents repay their microcredit 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
Figure 5.0 above shows that some of the customers were defaulting and that represented a total of 43 percent, 
with 31 percent disagreeing to the fact that they usually repay back the credit while 12 percent strongly agreeing 
to the same. On the other hand, a total of 57 percent answered otherwise with 18 and 39 percent representing 
strongly agree and moderately agree respectively. 
 
38% 
23% 29% 10% 
18% 
39% 31% 
12% 
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Table 4.8: The extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents repay microcredit at their 
maturity time. 
Figure 6.0: A graph showing the extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents repay their 
microcredit at their maturity time 
 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
The graph above shows 30 percent of the respondents agreed strongly that they were able to pay and 33 percent 
also agreed moderately. On other hand, 34 percent also disagreed and finally 3 percent strongly disagreeing to 
the questionnaire. The above responds then means that, in all 63 percent of the entire population that is the 
customers of SAT were being able to repay all their microcredits at their maturity times whiles 37 percent also 
saying that they were unable to repay. 
 
4.9 Some Causes of the Loan Default 
Below responses are to show out some of the reasons why most of the customers default after taken loans from 
the microfinance institutions.  
 
 Figure 7.0: A graph showing the extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents default 
because loan officers fail to come and collect their microcredit at their maturity time. 
 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
The above graph shows in percentage that 17 percent of customers strongly believe that loan officers failure to 
come to collect loans leads to their default whiles 34 percent also somehow agreed to the same assertion 
disagreed strongly. So in all it can be said that 51 percent agreed to the fact that they fail to repay loans when 
loan officers themselves refuse to come collect the loans by themselves.  
 
30% 33% 34
3% 
17% 
34% 38% 
11% 
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4.10: Does respondents default because the loans do not require any collateral 
Figure 8.0: A graph showing the extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents default 
because the loans do not require any collateral 
 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
Figure 8.0 shows that 7 percent of the respondents strongly agreed to the fact that they defaulted because most of 
the loans they take do not require any collateral whiles 16 percent also agreed moderately to the same question. 
However, some of the respondents also disagreed and that 49 percent disagreed whiles 28 percent in fact strongly 
disagreed.  Though in all it appears that majority disagreed but the point that 23 percent also agreed cannot be 
ignored. 
 
 
4.11 Does respondents default because of higher interest rates? 
Figure 9.0: A graph showing the extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents default 
because of higher interest rates. 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
The pie chart above is figure 9.0 also was to find out whether interest charges on loans also account for default. 
Besides, it shows that 37 percent strongly agreed to interest rates being higher and so account for their default 
whiles 44 percent also agreed moderately. Despites, the fact that some agreed does not means all did, some 
respondents also thought otherwise and that 16 percent disagreed and finally 3 percent also disagreeing strongly. 
This therefore means that 81 percent of the total respondents agreed that interest charge is also a factor to default 
of loans. 
 
7% 
16% 
49% 
28% 
3
216%
% 
44% 
37% 
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4.12 Diversions of Loans from Their Intended Purposes 
Figure 10.0: A graph showing the extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents divert the 
loans from its intended purposes 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
The graph above shows that 14 percent of the respondents strongly agreed to the fact that they were using part of 
the loan amount for occasional events such as marriages, funeral, etc. whiles 20 percent also moderately agreed. 
It also shows that 47 percent of the respondents disagreed and 19 percent also strongly disagreeing. 
 
4.13: The extent of agreement and disagreement whether respondents use greater portion of loans to feed 
the family 
Figure 11.0: A graph showing the extent of agreement and disagreement of whether respondents use 
greater portion of loans to feed the family 
 
Source: Field Survey. June, 2013. 
The bar graph above shows that 13 percent of the respondents strongly agreed that a greater proportion of the 
loan facility are used in providing daily food for the family whiles 24 percent also agreed moderately. 36 percent 
on the other hand disagreed and the remaining 27 percent also strongly disagreed. It is therefore clear that some 
customers were diverting the loans from their intended purposes. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
5.1 Summary of key findings 
The research revealed that both gender and the number of dependents had no significant effect on loan default in 
microfinance institutions though the female were defaulting more as compared to the males. Also, repayment 
schedule which happens to be the main independent variable had no significant relationship with loan default 
from the study. However, those customers given less repayment time defaulted more than those given longer 
period of time. Meanwhile, interest rates charged on loans, moral hazard and customers who took additional 
loans to that of Sinapi Aba Trust had a significant positive relationship with loan default. The study also revealed 
that some borrowers diverted the loans from their intended purposes. The research also revealed some of the 
causes that contributed to the default by some customers such as lack of collateral and high interest rates. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
Based on the research conducted to examine the relationship between loan default and repayment schedule in 
microfinance institutions in Ghana, it was found out that, the repayment schedule had no significant effect on 
14%
% 
20% 
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19% 
13% 
24% 
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27% 
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loan default. The test for the Null hypothesis thus holds, that is “there is no relationship between loan default and 
repayment schedule”. 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
Based on the findings that our study revealed, the following recommendations have been suggested to prevent 
loan defaults: 
• Collateral should be provided against loans by borrowers in order to motivate them to repay back the 
loans. 
• Microfinance institutions should motivate client officers to spend more time to visit clients and 
finishing client’s files in reasonable time. Institutions should periodically organize award ceremonies 
for clients who diligently pay their installments on time, to encourage others to emulate them. 
• There should be proper screening before loans are granted to them (borrowers). 
• Penalties should be applied to past due or unpaid loans to discourage defaults. It can be in the form of 
refusal of new loans to borrowers who default. 
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